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SELLING SHARES TO RETAIL INVESTORS: 
AUCTION VS. FIXED PRICE 
 








  We analyze the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to a large number of 
buyers when demand is uncertain. We characterize equilibria of two popular 
mechanisms, a fixed price mechanism and a uniform price auction, and compare the 
revenues. While in the auction truthful bidding is a dominant strategy, we find that 
bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand in the fixed price mechanism. For 
some parameter values this yields the surprising result that the fixed price mechanism 
outperforms the auction. 
Keywords: IPO, Uniform Price Auction, Open Offer, Proportional Rationing. 
 




The three commonly used methods to sell shares in an initial public oﬀering
(IPO) are bookbuilding, open oﬀer (or ﬁxed price), and auctions. While
bookbuilding and open oﬀer have been predominant for a long time, auctions,
recently held over the internet, are becoming more and more popular. It
is still an open question which mechanism best serves the purposes of the
seller. This is certainly due to the multitude of aspects to be taken into
consideration.
Many papers on IPOs concentrate on informational aspects. Since the
value of the issue is usually insuﬃciently known, the seller needs to gather
information from large (informed) investors. Several authors show that
bookbuilding allows to credibly extract information from large investors and
thereby reduces the uncertainty about the issue. When compared to an auc-
tion, bookbuilding leads to more eﬃcient information acquisition, since it
gives the seller total discretion in the allocation of shares.1 To a lesser extent
this also holds true for the ﬁxed price method.2
While these informational aspects seem to be crucial in the relationship
between seller and large investors, revenue is likely to be a predominant
concern if it comes to selling shares to retail investors. Consider, for example,
the following hybrid procedure which is indeed used in many countries:3
First, the seller allocates a proportion of shares to (informed) large investors
1Benveniste and Wilhelm (1989) show that with bookbuilding underpricing is necessary
to eﬀectively extract information from investors. Sherman and Titman (2000) analyze the
bookbuilding method when information acquisition by large investors is costly. Moreover,
Sherman (2000a) shows that bookbuilding leads to more eﬃcient information acquisition
than auctions.
2Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) study a model with informed regular investors and
uninformed retail investors. A combination of price and allocation discrimination between
these groups leads to eﬃcient revelation of the information held by informed investors.
However, price discrimination is not allowed in some countries. Furthermore, there are
fairness rules which regulate the allocation of shares.
3Sherman (2000a) provides a survey of IPO methods used by more than 40 countries.
2using a bookbuilding mechanism. Second, he sells the remaining shares to
(uninformed) retail investors, using either a ﬁxed price mechanism or an
auction. Since information extraction is not the issue at this stage, the seller
would like to choose the mechanism that maximizes expected revenue.
There are several reasons why selling shares to retail investors is impor-
tant. To start with, it is a means of limiting the control of large investors
over the ﬁrm. Furthermore, the issue may be too large to be absorbed by in-
stitutional investors only. Finally, the widespread availability of the internet
makes the distribution of information by the seller and the placing of orders
by retail investors cost–eﬃcient and easy.
The aim of this paper is to compare the ﬁxed price method and a uniform
price auction when demand is uncertain (it can be either high or low) and
there is a large number of potential buyers, who have private valuations.
These assumptions seem to be justiﬁed if we consider the second stage of
the mechanism described above, because it is reasonable to assume that
the outcome of the bookbuilding stage will reveal the information held by
institutional investors. Thus, after the bookbuilding stage, the common value
of the issue is public information and demand of retail investors only depends
on their preferences.
Usually, the ﬁxed price method includes fairness rules which allow dis-
crimination of buyers only on the basis of order size. In some countries,
e. g. the United Kingdom, there is proportional (pro rata) rationing if the
issue is oversubscribed. This motivates us to analyze the following variant
of the ﬁxed price method: First, the seller sets a price. Then, buyers submit
their demand. If there is excess demand buyers are rationed according to the
proportional rule.
Under proportional rationing with demand uncertainty bidders have an
incentive to overstate their demand in order to alleviate the eﬀects of being
rationed in high demand scenarios. We show that the ﬁxed price mechanism
has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where bidders are rationed in the high
demand scenario while there is no rationing in the low demand scenario. In
3equilibrium, buyers demand substantially more than their desired quantity.
Furthermore, we show that in a private values framework with a large
number of small bidders truthful bidding a is dominant strategy in the uni-
form price auction. Thus, the auction yields the same revenue as if the
seller was perfectly informed about demand but is restricted to linear prices.
Therefore, it seems quite intuitive that the auction is the more proﬁtable way
to sell shares when demand is uncertain. As Sherman (2000a) puts it, “most
ﬁnance academics would probably guess that auctions would be the best way
to maximize the seller’s revenues”. To the best of our knowledge, however,
this conjecture was never analyzed from a game–theoretic perspective.
The comparison of the two mechanisms yields a surprising result: Under
certain parameter conditions the ﬁxed price method outperforms the auction
in terms of revenue. More precisely, this is the case when the return per share
is relatively safe and aggregate demand is more likely to be low. Otherwise,
the revenue in the ﬁxed price mechanism is only slightly lower than the
revenue in the auction. Moreover, since the variance of the payoﬀ is lower in
a ﬁxed price mechanism4, a risk–averse seller would presumably prefer the
ﬁxed price method to the auction.
Uniform price auctions with a large number of bidders have been studied
by Nautz (1995) for risk–neutral bidders and Nautz and Wolfstetter (1997)
for risk–averse bidders. In both papers the authors argue that if there is a
large number of bidders they act as price takers in a uniform price auction
and therefore bid truthfully. Swinkels (2001) analyzes equilibria of uniform
price auctions as the number of bidders tends to inﬁnity and ﬁnds that the
optimal strategy converges to truthful bidding.
Moulin (2000) and Herrero and Villar (2001) provide axiomatic analysis
of rationing schemes. They show that proportional rationing is among the
three rationing methods that satisfy “equal treatment of the equals”, i. e. the
allocation depends on bids only, and certain other procedural requirements.
4In many cases the revenue has zero variance at the price which maximizes expected
revenue. This is shown in section 4.2.
4Moreover, the proportional rule is “fair”, since the ratio of supply to demand
is the same for all buyers. Finally, collusion of a group of buyers has no impact
on the allocation to other buyers. The strategic incentives from rationing
are analyzed, among others, by Bulow and Klemperer (1997) and Gilbert
and Klemperer (2000). The ﬁrst paper shows that prices which result in
rationing can be optimal if a common value is to be sold, the second paper
comes to the same conclusion for situations where customers must make
sunk investments to enter the market. Nautz and Oechssler (2003) analyze
proportional rationing in a private values framework, however, they obtain a
nonexistence result that is due to the fact that bidders know that they are
always rationed (there is no demand uncertainty).
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 contains an analysis of the auction. In section 4 we present the ﬁxed
price mechanism. Then, we derive the equilibrium strategies of the buyers.
Finally, we characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the entire game.
Section 5 compares the expected revenue in the ﬁxed price mechanism and
the auction. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix unless
they provide an intuition for the results.
2 The Model
One perfectly divisible unit of shares is to be sold by a seller whose objective
is to maximize expected revenue.5 The ﬁnal payoﬀ per unit is a random
variable Y which is normally distributed with mean µ = 1 and variance
σ2 > 0.




of (potential) buyers, where θ > 0. The









5In Bierbaum and Grimm (2002) cases where the seller has diﬀerent objectives are
analyzed.
5where w denotes the buyer’s wealth, and θ−1 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion of buyer θ.T h et y p eθ is private information of each buyer and the
distribution of buyers is given by a (probability) distribution function F.W e
assume that F has no atoms, which implies that a single buyer has no weight,
i. e. all buyers are small (retail) investors. The total mass of buyers is not
perfectly known. Instead, there are two possible scenarios: with probability
g1 the mass is m1 > 0 (scenario 1), with probability (1 − g1)t h em a s si s
m2 >m 1 (scenario 2). Thus, the distribution of buyers in scenario i is given
by the cdf6
Fi = miF. (2)
All this is common knowledge. Note that since the (probability) distribu-
tion F over types is the same in each scenario, no buyer can infer the true
distribution from his type.
Denote the initial wealth of buyer θ by wθ.7 His expected utility of buying




























θα(Y − p) ∼ N
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It follows that individual demand is
α(p,θ)=
µ − p
σ2 · θ. (4)
6Note that unless mi = 1 this is not a distribution function of a probability measure.
7Because of exponential utility the distribution of wealth does not aﬀect our analysis.














θdF (θ) > 0. (6)
Since γ2 >γ 1 we can interpret scenario 1 and 2 as low demand scenario and
high demand scenario, respectively. It follows from equation (5) that inverse





Recall that the seller can sell at most one unit. Therefore, the market clearing
price in scenario i is Pi (1) = µ − 1
γi, which is an increasing function of γi.
Now, we calculate the monopoly price pi in scenario i. Because of the




Ai (p)ps . t . p ≥ Pi (1). (8)
From the ﬁrst–order condition γi (µ − 2p) ≤ 0 and the constraint p ≥ µ − 1
γi









We assume that demand is so large that the capacity constraint is binding
in both scenarios, i. e. pi = Pi (1) for i =1 ,2. This implies that γ1 ≥ 2µ−1.
3 Uniform Price Auction
When an auction is used for an IPO it is most often uniform–price sealed–
bid.8 This auction format meets various requirements like charging all cus-
tomers an equal price9 and, in addition, is strategically simple when there
8See for example Kandel et al. (1999), who analyze IPO auctions in Israel, or Sherman
(2000a).
9Cf. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990).
7are many bidders. It is well known that there are quite unappealing low price
equilibria when the number of bidders is small. However, if the number of
bidders is large, tacit collusion may not be the issue as is shown in Biais and
Faugeron–Crouzet (2000).
In order to analyze the auction game we have to distinguish the demand
which is revealed in the auction from true aggregate demand Ai, as deﬁned
by equation (5).
Definition 1 (Revealed Demand) The revealed demand of bidder θ is
a measurable and non–increasing function p  → d(p,θ),w h e r e0 ≤ p ≤ 1.





The rules of the auction are as follows: First, bidders submit their de-
mand schedules. Thereafter, aggregate revealed demand is calculated. The
auctioneer chooses the highest price such that aggregate revealed demand
equals supply, i. e. in scenario i the auction price is
p
A
i =m a x{p ∈ [0,1] : Di(p)=1 }. (11)
Bidder θ obtains d(pA
i ,θ) shares at unit price pA
i .I fn om a r k e tc l e a r i n gp r i c e
exists the seller keeps the shares and the bidders pay nothing.
The following lemma shows that if a market clearing price exists in sce-
nario i the revenue in the auction in this scenario is equal to the revenue
which a monopolist would obtain from setting a linear price under complete
information.
Lemma 1 In any pure strategy equilibrium the auction price in scenario i is
pA
i = Pi(1) = pi. The revenue in the auction is RA
i = pi.
Proof Since there is continuum of buyers, a single buyer’s bid has no
impact on aggregate revealed demand.10 Therefore, bidders act as price
10It is well known that uniform price auctions create an incentive to reduce demand on
8takers. The continuum also implies that in any (pure strategy) equilibrium
of the game there are only two equilibrium prices pA
1 and pA
2 , which occur







i . This implies that the equilibrium price in
scenario i is pA
i = Pi (1) = pi. Since supply is normalized to one, we also
obtain RA
i = pi. 
If we restrict our attention to equilibria with market clearing we obtain
the following result, which immediately follows from the lemma.
Theorem 1 The expected revenue in the auction is







Quite intuitively, the expected revenue increases as the probability of the
high demand scenario increases. As we have shown in lemma 1, the revenue in
the auction is equal to the revenue that would be raised by linear monopoly
prices under complete information about the demand scenario. Note that
this implies that setting a reservation price does not improve the auction.
Moreover, the auction is strategically very simple for both, the seller and the
buyers. None of them needs to take into consideration any information except
for their own in order to derive their optimal strategies. These properties
make the auction a very appealing selling mechanism.
4 Fixed Price plus Proportional Rationing
In this section we describe and analyze the second mechanism: The seller
sets a ﬁxed price and applies proportional rationing in the case of excess
demand. Proportional rationing is used in several countries and seems to
all but the ﬁrst unit if bidders may inﬂuence the price by their bid. See, for example,
Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993). However, for a continuum of buyers a single
buyer has no impact on aggregate revealed demand. This is similar to the results of Nautz
and Wolfstetter (1997) and Swinkels (2001), who analyze auctions when there is a large
number of bidders.
9be a good approximation for other rationing methods applied in IPOs, since
it satisﬁes certain fairness rules.11 While priority rules may also be used to
allocate shares to speciﬁc groups of investors, proportional rationing is most
likely being applied within these groups.
Definition 2 (Proportional Rationing) Let d ≥ 0 be a buyer’s indi-
vidual revealed demand, D>0 aggregate revealed demand, and denote total
supply by S>0. Under proportional rationing the buyer gets
d















is called rationing factor.
Recall that in our model the seller can sell at most one unit. Thus, bid-
ders are rationed whenever aggregate revealed demand exceeds 1. However,
revealed demand may also fall short of 1, in which case each bidder gets the
demanded quantity.
Note that under proportional rationing truthful bidding cannot be an
equilibrium. To see this, suppose that all the other bidders bid truthfully.
Then, a bidder has an incentive to overbid his true demand in order to
increase the (too low) quantity he gets in the high demand scenario at the
(initially low) cost of getting a bit too much in case demand is low. Since this
increases demand in the low demand scenario, the seller’s expected payoﬀ is
certainly higher than under truthful bidding and the market clears at prices
strictly higher than p1.
The above reasoning raises two questions: First, does the ﬁxed price
mechanism have an equilibrium at all12 and, if so, can revealed demand be
11For a detailed analysis of the properties of proportional rationing and other rationing
rules cf. Moulin (2000) or Herrero and Villar (2001).
12This is also of practical relevance, since it is not very appealing to use a selling mech-
anism that has no equilibrium. Nautz and Oechssler (2003) showed that there is no
equilibrium of the proportional rationing game when demand is certain.
10high enough to allow for charging a price that yields a higher expected payoﬀ
than the auction?
In order to be able to compare the expected revenues in the auction and
the ﬁxed price mechanism, in this section we ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium
of the ﬁxed price mechanism. We start with the description of the game.
First, nature draws the state of the world (i. e. scenario 1 or scenario 2).
Neither the buyers, nor the seller observe the state, however, it is common
knowledge that the probability of low demand is g1.T h e r e a f t e r ,w eh a v et w o
stages. At the ﬁrst stage, the seller oﬀers one unit of shares at a price p ≥ 0
and decides on an upper limit on individual demand, d (i. e. no single buyer
can ask for more than d shares). At the second stage, which we call bidding
stage, each buyer submits his individual demand 0 ≤ d ≤ d as a sealed
bid. From the bids aggregate revealed demand D is calculated. Finally, a
buyer who has demanded d shares gets ds shares and pays dsp,w h e r eds is
determined by proportional rationing.
As in section 3, denote buyer θ s revealed demand at price p by d(p,θ).
It follows that revealed demand Di(p) in scenario i is given by (10). For
simplicity we denote the corresponding rationing factor by







Since the true scenario is unknown, the rationing factor is a random variable
  Q with realization Qi in scenario i.
Now, we can determine the players’ payoﬀs. The seller’s revenue in sce-
nario i is given by
R
F
i (p)=QiDi(p) · p. (16)
Hence, expected revenue is
πF (p)=R
F
1 (p)g1 + R
F
2 (p)(1− g1). (17)
Since it is common knowledge that the buyers have the same information
about the demand scenario as the seller, the price set by the seller at stage
11one cannot reveal information about the demand scenario.13 Therefore, for






d(p,θ)   Q,p,θ
  
= U (d(p,θ)Q1,p,θ)g1 (18)
+U (d(p,θ)Q2,p,θ)(1− g1).
Note that the expected utility of buyer θ depends only on the aggregate
numbers Q1 and Q2 while individual demand of other buyers plays no role.14
4.1 Optimal Bidding in the Rationing Game
In this section we analyze the bidding stage that starts after a price p ∈
[p1,p 2] has been announced by the seller.15 Note that for a given price p
and a given belief about the probability of the low demand scenario the
set of sequentially rational strategies of the buyers coincides with the set of
Nash equilibria of the game that corresponds to the bidding stage. Thus,
although the bidding stage is no (sub-) game in a strict sense we speak of
an equilibrium of the bidding stage. We proceed in two steps: First, we
analyze a bidder’s best reply against a given random rationing factor, and
thereafter we use the result in order to characterize the equilibrium of the
bidding stage. In this section we ignore the upper limit on revealed demand
d, since the analysis would only be complicated without providing additional
insights. As we will show in section 4.2, the seller never chooses an upper
limit that aﬀects bidding behavior at the price he chooses in equilibrium.16
Let us start by deriving the best response (optimal demand) of a single
buyer θ at price p for a given aggregate revealed demand of the other buyers.
13See also condition B(iii), ”no signaling what you don’t know”, in Fudenberg and
Tirole’s (1998) deﬁnition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
14The bidding stage resembles an anonymous game as analyzed by Blonski (2001).
15It is easy to show that in equilibrium no price outside this interval will be posted by
a seller.
16However, d will be crucial in order to be able to establish existence of an equilibrium
of the ﬁxed price mechanism.
12Since there is a continuum of buyers, a single buyer’s demand d has no impact
on aggregate revealed demand Di in scenario i. We assume that D1 <D 2
which implies Q1 >Q 2.17
































(µ − p)   Q
  
.
Since α(p,θ) > 0, we can decompose d = x · α(p,θ), where x represents the
relative markup over the optimal number of shares.
Recall that under proportional rationing the quantity a buyer gets in
scenario i is ds
i = xα(p,θ)Qi. Obviously, a choice of x,w h e r exα(p,θ)Q1 <
α(p,θ) cannot be optimal which implies x ≥ Q
−1
1 . It follows from a similar
argument that x ≤ Q
−1








the buyer has to consider the trade–oﬀ between getting too little shares in the
case of high demand and getting too many shares in the case of low demand.
In the following, we will show that there is a unique solution to the buyer’s
problem, and that the markup factor that solves the above mentioned trade
oﬀ optimally does not depend on the buyer’s type. Substituting xα(p,θ) for
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17We will later show that this inequality holds in equilibrium.
18Here, we used that the conditional distribution of   Q(Y − p) given scenario i is
N
 
Qi (µ − p),Q 2
iσ2 
.














does not depend on θ,t h e
markup factor is type–independent. Inserting the optimal markup factor
x   Q(p,g1) into the decomposition d = x · α(p,θ) yields the following lemma
which summarizes the above results:
Lemma 2 There is a unique revealed demand d   Q (p,θ,g1)=x   Q (p,g1)α(p,θ)
which maximizes the utility of buyer θ for a given rationing factor   Q.T h e
markup factor x   Q(p,g1) does not depend on the buyer’s type θ. Moreover, it









Now, we can characterize the equilibrium of the bidding stage. In equilib-
rium each bidder chooses his best response revealed demand as characterized
in lemma 2 and, at the same time, the rationing factor must result from the
aggregate demand revealed by the bidders. Thus, if Di (p) is the realization




x   Q(p,g1)α(p,θ)dFi (θ)=x   Q(p,g1)Ai (p), (22)
where   Q is the rationing factor corresponding to   D. It follows that an
equilibrium of the bidding stage is described by a common markup factor
x = x(p,g1)w h e r e  Q is given by its realizations






,i =1 ,2. (23)
In order to emphasize that   Q is the rationing factor which corresponds to x




A2 in equilibrium. Thus,
revealed demand in scenario 2 is larger than revealed demand in scenario 1,
i. e. scenario 2 is the high demand scenario, as asserted. Inserting Q1 =1








































The following theorem shows that a unique equilibrium (in pure strate-
gies) of the bidding stage exists if the price is higher than a critical price that
depends on the probability of the low demand scenario, g1.
Theorem 2 Let p ∈ [p1,p 2] and let g1 be the probability of the low demand
scenario. The following claims hold true:
(i) There is a unique price pe = pe (g1) ∈ [p1,p 2] such that an equilibrium of
the bidding stage exists if and only if p ≥ pe. The function g1  → pe (g1)
is strictly decreasing, with pe (0) = p2 and pe (1) = p1.
(ii) For p>p e the equilibrium is unique. In this case, the equilibrium
markup factor x(p,g1) satisﬁes x(p,g1) <A 1 (p)
−1.
(iii) The only market clearing price is pe,i .e .Di (pe) ≥ 1 for i =1 ,2.I t
holds that x(pe,g 1) ≥ A1 (pe)
−1 .
Proof See the appendix. 
By combining lemma 2 and theorem 2 we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Let p ∈ (pe,p 2) and g1 ∈ (0,1). In the equilibrium of the
bidding stage there is no rationing in scenario 1 while all buyers are rationed




x(p,g1)α(p,θ) in scenario 1,
A2 (p)
−1 α(p,θ) in scenario 2.
15Proof See the appendix. 
The corollary shows that in equilibrium the number of shares which a
buyer gets in the high demand scenario does not depend on x while the
number of shares in the low demand scenario exceeds true demand by a
factor of x. Therefore, the markup factor x is optimally chosen such that a
marginal increase of the bid would increase the buyer’s utility in scenario 2 by
the same amount as it would decrease his utility in scenario 1. In equilibrium
the quantity a buyer gets in scenario 2 is given by α(p,θ)/A2 and therefore
marginal utility in the high demand scenario is ﬁxed. If p is too small relative
to g1, marginal utility at α(p,θ)/A2 is higher than marginal disutility at
xα(p,θ) for all x, where aggregate revealed demand in scenario 1, xA1,i s
lower than one. This provides an incentive to overstate demand in a way
that bidders are rationed in both scenarios. If this is the case, it is costless
to increasingly exaggerate bids and, thus, no equilibrium exists if g1 is too
high relative to p.
Remark 1 (No Trade) It can be shown that with exponential utility and
proportional rationing there is no incentive for aftermarket trade. At the ﬁnal
allocation the willingness to pay for an additional unit is independent of the
buyer’s type.
4.2 Equilibrium of the Fixed Price Mechanism
Now that we have characterized the equilibrium of the second stage of the
game, we are prepared to characterize the equilibrium of the ﬁxed price
mechanism. The seller’s objective is to choose p and d as to maximize ex-
pected revenue, anticipating the choice of the equilibrium markup factor at
the second stage.
If we ignore the upper limit on revealed demand, the seller’s revenue RF
i





p if p = pe(g1)






respectively. Hence, the expected revenue is
πF (p)=R
F
1 (p)g1 + R
F
2 (p)(1− g1). (27)
It is straightforward to show that πF is a continuous function.
Note that at p = pe(g1) the seller sells the whole quantity in both sce-
narios. Therefore, in equilibrium, he will never post a price below pe(g1).
Furthermore, if the upper limit d is binding for some or all bidders at a price
p ∈ [pe (g1),p 2], this unambiguously reduces the seller’s expected revenue at
that price p. Therefore, in equilibrium the seller will choose d high enough
not to aﬀect revealed demand in equilibrium. Thus, the upper limit does not
aﬀect the equilibrium outcome. However, it ensures existence of an equilib-
rium at the second stage also at prices below pe(g1). We are now prepared
to state the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 3 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (in pure strategies) of
the ﬁxed price mechanism exists. Every equilibrium strategy proﬁle  










∗ (p,θ)=x(p,g1) · α(p,θ) for p ∈ [p
∗,p 2],
πR (p
∗) ≥ pe (g1).
Proof If the upper limit d is high enough not to aﬀect revealed demand
at prices in [pe(g1),p 2] equilibrium demand of buyer θ at price p ∈ [pe(g1),p 2]
is given by
d
∗ (p,θ)=x(p,g1) · α(p,θ).
At price pe (g1) all shares are sold in both scenarios which implies that ex-
pected proﬁt is save and equal to pe (g1). Since there is only one unit for sale,
17setting a price below pe is strictly dominated for the seller. The expected
revenue πF is continuous on the compact set [pe (g1),p 2]. Thus, there exists
an equilibrium price p∗ ∈ [pe (g1),p 2] that maximizes the seller’s revenue.
Since d can only reduce the demanded quantity, the seller strictly prefers
a limit that does not aﬀect revealed demand by any bidder at the optimal
price p∗,i .e .¯ d∗ ≥ x(p∗,g 1)α(p∗,θ). We show in the appendix that due to the
upper bound on revealed demand an equilibrium of the bidding stage exists
at all prices p ∈ [p1,p 2]. 
The theorem shows that the equilibrium payoﬀ πF (p∗) is uniquely de-
termined. It includes two possible cases: p∗ = pe (g1)a n dp∗ >p e (g1). By
theorem 2 the seller realizes a riskless proﬁt equal to pe (g1) in the ﬁrst case
while in the second case the return is risky, with RF
2 (p∗)=p∗ >R F
1 (p∗).
We have run numerical simulations which show that both cases can occur
depending on the choice of the parameters σ,γ1,γ 2 and g1.19
4.3 Comparative Statics
In this section we study the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium
markup factor x(p,g1)a tap r i c ep>p e (g1) with respect to σ2.
In order to characterize the eﬀect of the asset’s risk on the equilibrium
markup factor we ﬁx p ∈ (pe (g1),p 2)a n dγi (i =1 ,2).20 That is, we assume
that aggregate demand Ai (p) remains constant while σ2 varies. By deﬁnition
of γi this implies that mean risk aversion in the population decreases as σ2
increases.
Consider the function c(p)=(
µ−p
σ )2, which obviously is decreasing in σ2.
Therefore, an increase in σ2 is equivalent to a decrease in c.
Consider the indirect utility function V (z)=U (z · α(p,θ),p,θ) of buyer

















19Cf. Bierbaum and Grimm (2002).
20Note that pe depends on σ2. However, if p>p e (g1) for some σ2 this inequality also
holds true for every   σ2 close to σ2.
18Recall that the equilibrium markup factor x solves an optimal trade–oﬀ be-
tween the two demand scenarios, i. e. the expected marginal beneﬁt of over-
stating demand in scenario 2 equals the expected marginal loss of doing so





in scenario 2 and V   (x) in scenario 1, respectively. Now, as c varies the
equilibrium quantity in scenario 2 does not change, since A2 remains con-
stant. However, since c determines the marginal utilities in scenario 1 and 2,
x depends on c. In the following, we characterize this dependence of x on c.
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For ∆ > 0 the RHS of (29) is strictly increasing in c, while for ∆ < 0i ti s
strictly decreasing. For ∆ = 0 the RHS is constant in c.S i n c e c>0a n d
x ≥ 1, the RHS is strictly decreasing in x while the LHS is strictly increasing.
It follows that in the case ∆ > 0a ni n c r e a s ei nc has to be compensated by
an increase in x which, in turn, decreases ∆. For ∆ < 0 it is the other way
around.
These ﬁndings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let x be the equilibrium markup factor at p, for parameters
g1 and σ2.
(i) If ∆ > 0 the equilibrium markup factor x is strictly decreasing in σ2.
(ii) If ∆=0the equilibrium markup factor x is constant in σ2.
(iii) If ∆ < 0 the equilibrium markup factor x is strictly increasing in σ2.
195 Auction versus Fixed Price
Now we are prepared to compare the revenues of the two mechanisms. In
the ﬁxed price mechanism, as we have shown in the previous section, bidders
have an incentive to overstate their demand under proportional rationing,
which raises the expected revenue at a given price. However, because of the
ﬁxed price, this mechanism does not adapt to the realized scenario. In the
auction, prices optimally adapt to the realized scenario while for a given price
demand is lower than in the ﬁxed price mechanism. Thus, we have to ﬁnd
out which of these properties is the more important one. We will show that
the answer to this question is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of
the model.
It seems impossible to derive the expected proﬁt in the ﬁxed price method
explicitly. Instead, we use an indirect approach, where we compare the ex-
pected revenues in the auction and the ﬁxed price mechanism with a bench-
mark revenue. The benchmark revenue is the expected revenue which would
obtain if buyers bid as if they were risk–neutral when choosing the markup
factor under proportional rationing. We prove in lemma 3 that the bench-
mark revenue and the expected revenue in the auction are equal. Then, in
lemma 4, we compare the markup factor in the ﬁxed price mechanism with
the markup factor in the benchmark case. Finally, we use these lemmas to
obtain a comparison of the auction and the ﬁxed price mechanism (theorem
4).
If a buyer is risk–neutral with respect to the choice of the markup factor
x he maximizes his utility given the expected value ˆ Qx = Eg1[  Qx]o f  Qx,a s

















x − x ˆ Qx
  
=0 . (31)
Thus, the benchmark markup factor solves x = ˆ Q−1
x which ensures that buyer
θ gets α(p,θ) shares in expectation.
Since there is only one unit for sale, the ﬁxed price mechanism cannot
20raise a higher expected revenue than the auction if the price is below πA.
Thus, we can restrict our analysis to prices p ≥ πA.
In the following lemma we derive the benchmark markup factor and show
that benchmark revenue and auction revenue are equal.
Lemma 3 Let p ∈ [πA,p 2), let the benchmark markup factor xB(p,g1) be the
solution to (31), and denote the benchmark revenue by πB. It holds that








(ii) πB (p)=xB (p,g1)γ1 (1 − p)pg1 + p(1 − g1)
(iii) πA is the unique maximizer of πB. The optimal benchmark revenue is
π∗
B = πB (πA)=πA.
Proof See the appendix. 
Part (i) of the lemma shows that the benchmark markup factor xB does
not depend on σ2. In particular, xB does not depend on the slope of the in-
direct utility function V . In contrast, the equilibrium markup factor x(p,g1)
does depend on the slope of V which varies in σ2. In the following lemma we
use the ﬁrst–order condition (24) to compare the markup factors xB(p,g1)
and x(p,g1).
Lemma 4 Let p ∈ [πA,p 2].
(i) If g1 ∈ (0, 1
2] the markup factor x(p,g1) does not exceed the benchmark
markup factor xB(p,g1).
(ii) If g1 ∈ (1
2,1) there exists a critical value σ2(p,g1) > 0 of the asset’s
variance such that
x(p,g1) >x B (p,g1) or pe (g1) >π A ⇔ σ
2 <σ
2(p,g1).
Proof The proof proceeds in 4 steps.
21(1) If σ2 is not too small (i. e. σ2 ≥ 1
8) hp(y), as deﬁned by (21), is convex
(see the appendix) and it holds by Jensen’s inequality that
Eg1[hp(xB   QxB)] ≥ hp(Eg1[xB   QxB]) = hp(xB   QxB)=0 .
Since the left hand side of this inequality is strictly increasing, we conclude
that x(p,g1) ≤ xB(p,g1)i nt h i sc a s e .
(2) We take a closer look at the equilibrium equation (29) to derive con-
ditions for x(p,g1) >x B(p,g1)a n dx(p,g1) ≤ xB(p,g1), respectively. It is















V   (xB)
. (32)
Recall that xB does not depend on c. As in the preceding section we use ∆,
as deﬁned by (30), to analyze the behaviour of (32).
If ∆ > 0 it holds that the RHS of (32) is strictly increasing in c with
limit ∞ as c goes to inﬁnity. Thus, there is a number c0 such that we have
”<” in (32) if and only if c>c 0 (the “only if” part follows from the fact
that for small c we have x(p,g1) ≤ xB(p,g1)). It follows by monotonicity
that x(p,g1) >x B(p,g1) for c>c 0 and p ≥ pe(g1). This immediately implies
pe (g1) >π A (see theorem 2).
If ∆ ≤ 0 the RHS of (32) is decreasing in c (strictly for ∆ < 0i nw h i c h
case the limit as c goes to inﬁnity is zero). By the result of step 1 we know
that there is a number ˜ c such that x(p,g1) ≤ xB(p,g1) for all c ≤ ˜ c. Thus,
we have ”≥” in (32). By monotonicity this also holds true for all c>˜ c which
implies that x(p,g1) ≤ xB(p,g1) for all c>0.





corresponds to the case ∆ > 0 while
g1 ∈ (0, 1






























22We conclude that ∆ > 0 if and only if g1 > 1
2.
(4) Now, we can put things together. If g1 ≤ 1
2 we have ∆ ≤ 0. Thus,
x(p,g1) ≤ xB(p,g1) for all σ2 in this case which proves part (i) of the lemma.
Finally, if g1 > 1
2 it holds that ∆ > 0i nw h i c hc a s ex(p,g1) >x B(p,g1)( o r
pe (g1) >π A) if and only if c>c 0, where c0 depends on p and g1. By deﬁnition
of c this implies that x(p,g1) >x B(p,g1)( o rpe (g1) >π A)i se q u i v a l e n tt o
σ2 <c
−1
0 (µ − p)
2 = σ2 (p,g1). This proves part (ii) of the lemma. 
From lemma 3 we know that the optimal expected benchmark revenue
πB is equal to the expected auction revenue πA. It follows from part (ii)
of the same lemma that proportional rationing yields a lower payoﬀ than
the auction if the equilibrium markup factor x(p,g1) is smaller than the







and σ2 is suﬃciently large.





and σ2 <σ 2(πA,g 1). Because of
xB (πA,g 1)γ1 (1 − πA) = 1 it follows from theorem 2 (iii) that pe (g1) >π A.
Since all shares are sold at price pe (g1) under the ﬁxed price mechanism, we
conclude that π∗
F >π A.21
These surprising results are summarized in our main theorem.
Theorem 4 [Comparison of Revenues]
(i) If g1 ∈ (0, 1
2] the revenue in the ﬁxed price mechanism does not exceed
the revenue in the auction.
(ii) If g1 ∈ (1
2,1) the ﬁxed price mechanism yields a strictly higher revenue
than the auction if and only if the variance of the asset is below a
critical value σ2(g1).
21Note that the equilibrium price in the ﬁxed price mechanism might be larger than
pe (g1). Moreover, since the seller chooses the optimal price from the set [pe (g1),p 2], the
critical value of σ2 depends only on g1.
236 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have characterized the equilibria of a uniform price auction
and a ﬁxed price mechanism when a perfectly divisible good is sold to a large
number of bidders. In addition, we have compared the expected revenues in
the two mechanisms.
In the uniform price auction truthful bidding is an equilibrium. Moreover,
in any pure strategy equilibrium the seller’s revenue in each scenario equals
the revenue from linear monopoly pricing under complete information about
the demand scenario.
We have then analyzed a ﬁxed price mechanism where the bidders are
proportionally rationed in case of excess demand. We have shown that a
pure strategy equilibrium of the ﬁxed price mechanism exists. In equilibrium
bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand in order to alleviate the
eﬀects of being rationed in the high demand scenario. It follows that there
always exists a price that is strictly higher than the revenue in the auction
when demand is low, but still yields a safe revenue (i. e. the whole quantity is
sold in both scenarios). Moreover, the revenue in the ﬁxed price mechanism
is typically less volatile than the revenue in the auction. We have also shown
that revealed demand depends on the variance of the asset that is oﬀered for
sale.
A comparison of the two mechanisms yields a surprising result: For cer-
tain parameter values, namely a low variance of the asset and, at the same
time, a suﬃciently high probability of low demand, the ﬁxed price mecha-
nism raises a higher expected revenue than the uniform price auction. This
is rather counterintuitive, because in each scenario the uniform price auc-
tion yields the same payoﬀ as linear monopoly prices in the case of complete
information about the demand scenario. However, imperfect information al-
lows the seller to ask for a price that is close to, or even higher, than the
average price that bidders would be willing to pay in the case of complete
information.
The analysis shows that a seller may beneﬁt from demand uncertainty.
24Our results might contribute to understanding decisions of how and when
to sell. Consider, for example, a monopolist who produces a good, where
demand is uncertain today and is revealed in the next period. Should the
ﬁrm sell before or after demand is observed? If the alternatives are to sell
immediately at a ﬁxed price or to wait until aggregate demand is known
our framework applies. Using a ﬁxed price mechanism corresponds to selling
immediately while the auction yields the same revenue as selling after demand
has been observed.
The ranking of the two mechanisms from the seller’s point of view might
not only depend on the expected revenue but also on the volatility of the
payoﬀ and on the minimum payoﬀ (in the case of low demand). As to the
ﬁrst point, a risk–averse seller might prefer the ﬁxed price mechanism even
if the expected revenue is smaller than in the auction. In particular, the
variance of the revenue is zero in the ﬁxed price mechanism if the seller posts
the market clearing price. Another advantage of the ﬁxed price method, as
compared to the auction, relates to the second point: Since bidders exag-
gerate their demand in order to avoid severe rationing in the high demand
scenario, aggregate revealed demand will also be high in the low demand sce-
nario. This enables the seller to raise a higher minimum revenue than in the
auction. These issues are discussed in more detail in Bierbaum and Grimm
(2002), where numerical simulations are used to provide further insights.
Our ﬁndings might provide an additional justiﬁcation for the frequent
use of ﬁxed price mechanisms to allocate shares in initial public oﬀerings,
although, during the last decade auctions were proposed by many authors
as an alternative. However, even in our theoretical framework that abstracts
from the issue of information extraction from informed investors22 the ﬁxed
price method is not dominated by the auction in terms of revenue and has
some additional beneﬁts that might be valuable to the seller, like a less
volatile payoﬀ or a higher minimum revenue.
Still, several issues that could provide a deeper understanding of the
22This is the most common argument in favor of selling schemes that include rationing.
25strategic behavior in rationing games remain unsolved. First, we cannot
provide a complete economic intuition that explains the way in which the
asset’s variance aﬀects revealed demand. Second, it would be interesting to
analyze how the model behaves if one uses other utility functions for the
buyers. However, there are some technical diﬃculties involved. For example,
the markup factor is typically not type–independent which makes it hard to
show more than existence of an equilibrium and the incentive to overstate
demand. Moreover, type–dependent markup factors may lead to allocations,
where aftermarket trade is proﬁtable. Finally, we have assumed that the
number of bidders is large. In contrast, if the number of bidders is small
each bid has an impact on the price and the allocation, which strongly af-
fects incentives. For the uniform price auction it is well known that with a
small number of bidders, who demand several units each, there are equilibria
which yield a rather low revenue due to demand reduction. In the ﬁxed price
mechanism bidding less than one’s true demand is still a strictly dominated
strategy. However, we have not found a satisfactory characterization of the
equilibria of the rationing game when a single bidder’s demand has an impact
on aggregate demand. These issues await further research.
26Appendix
Proof of lemma 2 We have already shown that x   Q cannot be smaller than
Q
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is continuous we can apply the intermediate value
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 2.T h u sx   Q is uniquely determined. 
Proof of theorem 2 First, consider the case g1 ∈ (0,1). For any given



























(1 − g1)i fx ≥ xp,
where xp is deﬁned by
xp = A1 (p)
−1 .














p (x)g1 > 0i f1 ≤ x<xp,
0i f x ≥ xp.
Thus, x  → φ(x,p,g1) is strictly increasing on [1,xp) and constant on [xp,∞).





(1 − g1) ≤ 0
which holds with equality iﬀ p = p2. By monotonicity and the interme-
diate value theorem an equilibrium (in pure strategies) exists if and only
if φ(xp,p,g 1) ≥ 0. We show in the sequel that there is a unique price
pe = pe (g1)w h i c hs o l v e s
φ(xp,p,g 1) = 0. (34)
Since φ(x,p,g1)=φ(xp,p,g 1) for x ≥ xp, there is a continuum of of
equilibria for p = pe, while uniqueness obtains if φ(xp,p,g 1) > 0. In the ﬁrst
case we have x ≥ xp = A1 (p)
−1 which implies Di (p) ≥ 1 for i =1 ,2. In the
second case it holds that x<xp = A1 (p)
−1 implying Di (p) < 1 for i =1 ,2.
Thus, pe is the only market clearing price.
Since A1 (p2) < 1a n dA2 (p2) = 1 it holds that φ(xp2,p 2,g 1) > 0. As i m -
i l a ra r g u m e n ts h o w st h a tφ(xp1,p 1,g 1) < 0. By the intermediate value theo-
rem there exists a price pe ∈ (p1,p 2) which solves (34) . To prove uniqueness
of pe and the equilibrium markup factor x, it is suﬃcient to show that
∂
∂p
φ(xp,p,g 1)|p=pe > 0. (35)
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= Eg1 [ϕ(z,  γ)],

















Since z  (p) > 0 condition (35) is equivalent to
∂
∂z
Eg1 [ϕ(z,  γ)]|z=ze > 0. (36)















































































































































































































































































which is obviously true. This shows that pe is uniquely determined.


















∂zEg1 [ϕ(z,  γ)]|z=ze · z  (pe)
< 0.
F i n a l l y ,i ti se a s yt os e et h a tpe (1) = p1 and pe (0) = p2. 
Proof of corollary 1 By theorem 2 we have x(p,g1) ≤ A1 (p)
−1 . There-
fore, revealed demand in scenario 1 satisﬁes
D1 (p)=x(p,g1)A1 (p) ≤ A1 (p)
−1 A1 (p)=1
which proves the ﬁrst claim.
Since A2 (p) ≥ 1 for p ≤ p2 and x(p,g1) > 1 by lemma 2 revealed demand
in scenario 2 satisﬁes
D2 (p)=x(p,g1)A2 (p) > 1.








where equality holds if and only if p = p2. 
30Appendix to the proof of theorem 3 First note that if the upper limit
is not binding, an equilibrium of the bidding stage exists at all prices p ∈
[pe(g1),p 2]. Now suppose that at a price p a bidder θ’s revealed demand is
capped by d so that he cannot choose his best reply rationing factor x   Q(p,g1)
since this implied x   Q(p,g1)α(p,θ) > d. However, since the marginal utility
from increasing x is positive23 for all x ∈ [1,x  Q(p,g1)), the expected utility
of a bidder who is constrained by an upper limit on revealed demand is
maximized by choosing the upper limit. Therefore the optimal markup is
given by xθ(p,g1)=m i n ( x   Q(p,g1), d
α(p,θ)), so that
d(p,g1,θ)=xθ(p,g1)α(p,θ)
=m i n {x   Q(p,g1)α(p,θ),d}.
This implies that the rationing factor   Qx faced by the bidders in equilibrium
is given by its realizations



















Note that due to the upper limit on revealed demand an equilibrium of the
bidding stage exists at all prices in [p1,p 2], however, whenever the upper limit
is binding for one or more bidders, the type independence of the equilibrium
markup factor no longer holds. 
P r o o fo fl e m m a3 If a buyer is risk–neutral with respect to rationing (the
choice of x), he maximizes utility given the expected value ˆ Qx = Eg1[  Qx]o f
  Qx. From the FOC (20) it follows that x ˆ Qx =1 .S i n c e ˆ Qx ≤ 1 it holds that
x ≥ 1. By deﬁnition of   Qx and A2 ≥ 1w eg e t























23This follows from the monotonicity of Eg1[hp(x   Q)], as shown in the proof of lemma 2.
31It is easy to show that a number x which has xA1 > 1 cannot be a solution
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Thus, revealed demand in scenario 1 is given by
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The benchmark revenue at p ∈ [πA,p 2]i s
πB (p)=xB (p)γ1 (1 − p)pg1 + p(1 − g1)







and the derivative of πB,
∂
∂p






(1 − g1), (38)



















= −γ1 +2 g1 +
γ1 (1 − g1)
γ2
+( 1− g1)
< 2g1 +2( 1− g1) − γ1
=2 − γ1
≤ 0.
24We show later, that the solution xB to this equation satisﬁes xBA1 ≤ 1a sl o n ga s
p ≥ πA.
32Thus, marginal proﬁt is negative at p = πA. This also holds for all
p ∈ [πA,p 2], since marginal proﬁt, as given by (38), is decreasing. Since
revealed demand at p = πA is equal to one and proﬁt is decreasing in p
for p ∈ [πA,p 2], the benchmark case yields the same expected proﬁt as the
auction, which proves part (b) of the lemma. 
Proof of lemma 4 Proof that hp(y)i sc o n v e xi fσ2 is large enough:








































































































It follows that c ≤ 2 is suﬃcient for hp being convex. Since (1 − p)
2 ≤ 1
4 for
p ≥ p1 this is always the case if σ2 ≥ 1
8. 
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